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Introduction1
 
Whatever else he may be the US actor Charlie Sheen is an Internet phenomenon. To 
date more than 11 million people have watched a YouTube extract of Good Morning 
America in which Sheen appears to rant uproariously on bizarre topics such as ‘Tiger 
Blood’ and ‘Torpedoes of Truth’. A popular explanation repeated across TV 
entertainment news channels, newspapers and celebrity magazines, as well as Internet 
gossip sites is that Sheen is in the grip of some or other mental disorder. Perhaps, 
though what the globally mediated travails of Charlie Sheen do confirm is how many 
of us find crazy antics difficult to look away from when we are laughing so much. 
 
 However, the notion that millions find Charlie Sheen’s apparent craziness 
funny is discomforting. In recent years, campaigns by psychiatric professionals in 
various countries including Great Britain have highlighted the pernicious effects of 
stigma attached to mental distress (see Sartorius and Schulze 2005 for international 
anti-stigma perspectives). Some historians have also noted how contemporary 
psychiatric stigma has roots in a pre-modern world without psychiatry (Shorter 1997; 
Porter 2004). Thus, just as no one today would confine a distressed person in a strait-
jacket, to want to laugh or poke fun at the psychiatrically ill underlines the persistence 
of a historical track record of blaming ‘victims’ of mental illness for their otherness.  
 
 While I do not question the legitimacy or value of campaigns that challenge 
psychiatric stigma, in this article I want to propose that assumptions that place 
contemporary jokes and humour about psychiatry in a straightforward historical 
relationship to demonizing of mad folk in past times is misplaced. Thus, it is 
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genuinely surprising to note that the image of the mad in popular culture humour has 
received little scholarly attention in contemporary media and cultural analysis beyond 
criticism that comic images in the mass media parody a complex psychiatric reality 
(Wahl 1995; Philo et al. 1996). My analytical approach differs in that it brings past 
and present humour about psychiatry and its treatment of mad folk into colloquy to 
illuminate a darkly comic history.  
 
My approach in this article also recognizes how past and present jokes about 
madness are entrenched in a common cultural consciousness forming a social 
expression. How else could Shakespeare have got away with his classic one-liner in 
Hamlet about the mad English: ‘Tis no great matter there’ (quoted in Porter 1991, 
47)? In Freud’s theory about jokes and their relationship to the unconscious (Freud 
1960), we constantly deceive ourselves about why we laugh. This may account for 
jokes about sex or aggression, but it hardly explains the mass ranks of comical 
lunatics in Elizabethan or Jacobean drama (Hattori 1995) or eighteenth century 
cartoons satirizing delusions of monarchs and politicians (Kromm 2002). Telling 
jokes about or involving madness has long been a popular pastime of the English. 
 
Other histories of madness (Gilman 1982, 1988; Porter 2002) have also noted 
a complex relationship between madness and culture has evolved in which artists and 
writers over centuries rammed home a message that the mad are ‘other’ to rational 
society (Foucault 2005). We can see traces of this message about madness in our own 
contemporary culture of representing psychiatric otherness in jokes and popular 
humour. However, I want to suggest that framing popular humour about mental 
distress as stigmatizing per se ignores how jokes and humour are appropriated to 
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counter psychiatric otherness. This reverse discourse of psychiatric comedy begs the 
question whether mentally ill people who literally perform as psychiatric jokes in 
stand-up routines and other humorous enterprises are themselves ‘othering’ mental 
distress. This is a thorny issue in the politics of mental distress because we have long 
laughed at lunacy.  
 
Laughing at lunacy 
In the eighteenth century, the governors of London’s Bethlem Hospital, popularly 
known as Bedlam, seized on a market opportunity allowing paying visitors entry to 
gawp at lunatics. The frisson of the freakshow helped turn the idea of ‘Bedlam’ into a 
national joke (Porter 1987, 123) evidenced for instance in the mutable figure of ‘Tom 
of Bedlam’ who appeared as the butt of jokes about Bedlam in early modern English 
street ballads (Wiltenburg 1988). Such a practice confirms our twenty-first century 
sensibility that early modern attitudes to madness were unfeeling. But this raises a 
hermeneutical problem, which is how we are to interpret humour about madness and 
mad folk in a different historical period under different historical conditions.  
 
 Robert Darnton has drawn attention to difficulties of understanding what is 
historically humorous in his book The Great Cat Massacre (Darnton 1984). His 
account of how in 1730 Parisian print apprentices killed their employers’ wife’s cat as 
revenge for injustices they felt had been perpetrated against them, and then went on to 
perform mock trials and killings of every cat they could catch was retold more than 
twenty times in reportedly hilarious re-enactments in the print shop. Darnton’s 
probing of why the apprentices found the retelling of cat trials and killings hilarious is 
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pertinent to my own concerns in this article because the idea of laughing at lunatics is 
repulsive to modern sensibilities; like cat killing we simply do not get the joke.  
 
This begs the question: what did Bedlam sightseers find funny? Unfortunately, 
the historical record does not provide a definitive answer to this question although we 
do know that in teasing inmates of this human zoo, Bedlam sightseers rewarded 
inmates with pennies and other favours if their antics approximated to stereotypical 
‘mad’ behaviour (Porter 1987). Our own inability to ‘get’ what is funny in the antics 
of lunatics indicates the distance that separates us from Bedlam sightseers but also 
suggests that rather than interpreting the Bedlam freakshow as benighted compared 
with our own enlightened times, since this limits recognition of our own culture’s use 
of mad stereotypes for entertainment, we ask: who today finds mental distress funny?  
 
It would seem that many of us do especially when it involves a celebrity 
breakdown (Harper 2009). For instance, in 2007-2008 the US pop star Britney 
Spear’s mental distress dominated news media worldwide. In Britain, a front-page 
headline in the biggest selling tabloid newspaper The Sun declared, “Psychotic Brit 
Hits Rock Bottom”, salaciously reporting that, “‘They had to strap her down like a 
mental patient and she was going between laughing and hysterics. She appeared to be 
having a total psychotic breakdown. She just went crazy’” (5 January 2008, p. 1). An 
accompanying picture also highlighted restraints tied around Spears’ torso and legs.  
 
However, in the competitive multi-platform world of news and entertainment 
media, it was not enough to photograph Spears as ‘like a mental patient … going 
between laughing and hysterics’. The easy availability of 24-hour global 
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entertainment news channels means that newspaper readers might be tempted to look 
elsewhere for ‘entertaining’ footage of ‘Psychotic’ Brit’. Thus, The Sun and its News 
International stable mate The Times, directed readers to the online versions of these 
newspapers where they could “See video of Britney’s oddball behaviour over the last 
twelve months” including helpfully titled chapters such as “Britney Goes Beserk” 
(shaving off her hair) and “Britney’s Crazy Rant” (directed at chasing paparazzi).  
 
Writing in The Guardian Peter Preston provided a rare instance of journalistic 
self-reflection on his profession’s voyeuristic obsession with Spears’ mental distress: 
 
You can watch those ambulance scenes over and over on the Times website 
video. All the quality papers’ websites have the tale among their five most 
visited … From top to rock bottom, from Bournemouth to Beverly Hills, we 
are customers, cash payers, ad revenue fuellers, gawpers, bloggers. That’s the 
distressing bit. A deluded 26-year-old has lost her bearings and her two small 
children. And we’re queuing up for a peek and a snigger (Preston 2008, 28).  
The notion that we are ‘queuing up for a peek and snigger’ at a deluded 26-year old 
who has ‘lost her bearings’ is reminiscent of the eighteenth century practice of 
visiting Bedlam to gawp at lunatics. Should we therefore agree with Wahl’s (1995) 
assessment of modern media stereotypes of madness, which posits that little has 
changed over time in stigmatizing mental distress in popular humour?  
 
 The answer, in short, is no. This is because in my view Wahl’s assessment 
gives no opportunity to raise the question of historical change and continuity in comic 
representations of people with mental health problems and the popular reception of 
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these. My own analytic preference utilized in this article is to offer a comparative 
historical perspective on comic representations of people with mental health 
problems. This approach emphasises that we can only understand continuities in 
comic representations of madness/mental distress in relation to changing perceptions 
of psychiatry and its practitioners. And as we shall now see, psychiatry is a very 
funny business indeed; by which I mean both funny-peculiar and funny ha-ha. 
 
Psychiatry, funny-peculiar and funny ha-ha 
When Bethlem Hospital’s apothecary John Haslam was questioned by the 1815 
House of Commons Committee on Madhouses in England on reported abuses of 
patients inside the institution, he unsuccessfully tried to shift blame on to the 
institution’s recently and conveniently deceased surgeon, Dr Bryan Crowther. Haslam 
told the Committee that Crowther was both an alcoholic and raving mad such that he 
was often ‘so insane as to have a strait-waistcoat’ (Porter 1987, 125). It is not 
stretching the point to suggest that here is the likely historical source of today’s 
standard office witticism, “You don’t have to be mad to work here but it helps”! 
 
Also appearing before the same House of Commons Committee was Dr 
Thomas Monro, one of four successive generations of Monro to act as physician to 
Bethlem. When Monro was asked to explain his therapeutic rationale for using 
restraints such as irons and chains he revealed that in his own private asylum, unlike 
Bethlem, no such chains were used being ‘fit only for pauper lunatics: if a gentleman 
were put in irons, he would not like it’ (Porter 1987, 125). No-one on the Committee 
is reported as laughing at his explanation, though we might well do so today.  
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At the same time as Thomas Monro was manacling Bethlem’s pauper lunatics, 
the American psychiatrist, Benjamin Rush, was also busy devising torments dressed 
up as treatments. For instance, Rush constructed a ‘Tranquilliser chair’ and his sketch 
of the apparatus (see Porter 1991, plate 8) shows a patient literally in situ. The patient 
is shown with torso, arms and legs strapped to a chair while a wooden casing placed 
over the head inhibits sensation (in so far as a wooden casing over the head can do 
so). It strikes the modern viewer of the image as funny-peculiar yet is no joke; the 
Tranquilliser chair was used in Rush’s Philadelphia Asylum in the early years of the 
nineteenth century. However, such funny-peculiar psychiatric treatment seems almost 
quaint in relation to two ambitious twentieth-century psychiatric entrepreneurs.  
 
Firstly, there is the American Dr. Henry Cotton, who from 1907 pioneered 
surgical treatment for insanity. Cotton insisted on removing every tooth and his 
surgical skills killed hundreds of patients (some slowly starved), but were praised by 
members of his profession for advancing psychiatric science (Scull 2007). When he 
died his colleagues in the Trenton State Hospital initiated the ‘Cotton Award for 
Kindness’. Truly a madhouse! The second is the Portuguese psychiatrist Ugo Cerletti, 
who in 1938 introduced electro-convulsive therapy, which he developed after 
observing electricity subduing pigs in the slaughterhouse (Klein 2007). Such episodes 
in the history of psychiatry give a sense that doctors in past times were certifiable; not 
coincidentally a comic theme in popular culture humour (see Kullman 1985).  
 
It also suggests why when the late fashion designer Alexander McQueen used 
a mock-up of a Victorian asylum to showcase his 2001 Givenchy collection, the 
leader of Britain’s Royal College of Psychiatrists, Professor John Cox, complained 
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saying, “This is an appalling misuse of images portraying outdated psychiatric 
treatment and does nothing to encourage people with mental health problems to seek 
modern care and treatment” (Mind press release 2000). However, McQueen’s suicide 
in 2010 invites reinterpretation of his asylum show, which included bandaged 
supermodels sporting strait-jackets, as self-reflexive humour on the institutional 
straitjacket that came with producing six international clothing collections a year.  
 
As a man celebrated for clothing the rich and famous while cloaking his own 
misery with pills and alcohol, McQueen’s suicide suggests that he came to see the 
folly in maintaining a ‘normal’ appearance. While McQueen’s suicide was deadly 
serious, I do want to note the irony in that McQueen presumably preferred not to seek 
asylum (in the true sense of the word) in psychiatry. Given the history of funny-
peculiar psychiatric therapeutics I have sketched above, Cox’s complaint about 
McQueen conveniently ignores that psychosurgery and electric shock treatment 
remain in use as psychiatric therapies. That people experiencing mental distress 
decline and on occasion resist psychiatry’s help is not simply evidence that they lack 
insight into their condition (though of course this may also be the case). Viewed in 
this historical context, psychiatric treatments invite mockery, mirth, and parody. 
 
Psychiatry is also a funny business in another sense. Thus, when the great 
Swiss Professor of Psychiatry Eugen Bleuler introduced into psychiatric classification 
the term ‘schizophrenia’ in 1908 to emphasise his theory of a dissociative or 
‘splitting’ phenomena in the mind, he could not have anticipated how his combined 
Greek wording of ‘schizo’ (splitting) and ‘phrene’ (mind) as the label for this 
phenomenon would resonate with enduring fantasies about split personality. Nor 
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could Bleuler have known that by introducing the term schizophrenia to science he 
was also bequeathing to the wider world a resilient line in psychiatric jokes.  
 
Contemporary connoisseurs of jokes about schizophrenia need look no further 
than the popular micro-blogging site Twitter. Thus, anyone logging on to the site on 
11 May 2011, searching for entries for schizophrenia, would have found references 
not only to recent research on the condition and to psychiatry’s various drug 
treatments, but also tired jokes about split personality e.g. “I was suffering from 
schizophrenia but now I got these new pills we are feeling much better”. I am in half a 
mind (sorry) to offer my own (about-to-be doubly) bad joke on this splitting theme, 
which is that Twitter pulls those interested in schizophrenia in two directions at once. 
 
Those who twitter funny ha-ha gags about schizophrenia/split personality are 
not alone in poking fun at the popular meaning of the condition. This is the theme of 
the popular Farrelly Brothers film comedy Me, Myself and Irene (released in 2000), 
which features Jim Carrie as mild-mannered Charlie, who when deserted by his wife 
Irene and ridiculed by his family and community releases pent-up rage and transforms 
into his alter ego Hank. Diagnosed as having “advanced delusionary schizophrenia 
with involuntary narcissistic rage”, Charlie/Hank battle for Irene’s affections. Carrie’s 
frenetic turn as a man who suckles breasts, defecates on lawns, and terrorizes elderly 
people and children prompted one psychiatrist (Byrne 2000; 2009) to suggest that the 
film’s mocking portrayal of schizophrenia was a series of morally bad jokes. 
 
No laughing matter? Humour and the politics of mental distress 
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Bad jokes are by definition not funny though perhaps they are not wholly bad. For 
instance, during the 2010 UK General Election campaign, the mental health charity 
Rethink asked supporters to submit their favourite bad joke to its web site in support 
of the charity’s opposition to the popular view that “laughter a day keeps the doctor 
away”. Their aim was to counter the fiscally convenient idea that mental distress can 
be simply ‘laughed off’ by sufferers, and to remind politicians grappling with a 
grossly under-funded National Health Service that expenditure on psychiatric services 
should not be a low priority. Rethink also made the apparently related point that 
‘mental illness is no laughing matter’. How can we make sense of this claim?  
 
According to Michael Billig (2005), humour and ridicule are bedfellows in the 
social function of laughter. Billig’s thesis is that because laughter is learnt and taught 
it is rhetorical and thus we can identify the rhetorical opposite of laughter, which is 
‘unlaughter’. ‘‘Unlaughter’ can be used to describe a display of not laughing when 
laughter might otherwise be expected, hoped for or demanded’ (Billig 2005, 192). 
This refusal to laugh may be in opposition to the object or style of humour or it may 
result from agreement that what we once recently found funny, such as TV comedy 
shows or stand-up routines based on racist stereotypes, is now offensive.  
 
Consider a 1983 recording of a performance by the British stand-up comedian 
Jasper Carrott. Known to Carrott aficionados as the ‘nutter on the bus’ sketch 
(available to listen at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oYYo49R_ZS0), Carrott 
regaled his audience on the theme: “why does the nutter always sit next to me on the 
bus”. The audience roars with appreciative laughter as Carrott vocalises the humorous 
utterances of ‘the nutter on the bus’. The sketch continues with ‘the nutter’ sitting 
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down next to Carrott and fellow passengers relaxing to enjoy the show as the ‘nutter’ 
produces a tin of spam (a quintessentially British foodstuff beloved of British 
comedians ever since Monty Python’s skit), which he declares is a nuclear bomb.  
 
Almost thirty years on from its original telling, Carrott’s ‘nutter on the bus’ 
comic monologue makes uncomfortable listening; not only is it no longer funny, the 
term ‘nutter’ is now considered by many psychiatric professionals to be offensive to 
those suffering from mental distress. As the humour theorist Jerry Palmer (1994, 164) 
puts it, ‘a joke may become offensive if something in the circumstances is held to 
make the behaviour in question inappropriate, even if it is clear that what was 
intended was a joke and the circumstances are in principle favourable to humour’.  
 
The circumstances that render the ‘nutter on the bus’ joke offensive is a 
revivified politics of mental health (Sayce 2000) far removed from the existential 
musings of R.D. Laing and others in the late-1960s anti-psychiatric movement. The 
contemporary politics of mental health is one grounded in a struggle for civil rights:  
 
ONE group in the country has fewer rights than the rest of us. No one listens 
to what they say, they are mocked in harsh, ugly language and some can’t 
even vote. They can be discriminated against at work and locked up even 
when they have committed no crime. Comedians joke about them, headline-
writers demonise them and now the Government is set to erode their liberty 
yet further. They are the mentally ill, and their anger is growing - driving what 
could become Britain’s next great movement for civil rights (Freedland 1998, 
22). 
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 The notion that ‘comedians’ and ‘headline writers’ are catalysts for a civil rights 
movement may surprise some comedians and headline writers. But Freedland’s 
stirring prose does reflect unease that psychiatric-related discrimination is so deeply 
embedded in our popular humour that we fail to recognise its pernicious character 
(Sayce 2000). As Professor Louis Appleby, the National Clinical Director for Health 
and Criminal Justice (or England’s “mental health tsar” in popular parlance) puts it: 
 
Think about the last time you came across a mocking comment about mental 
illness - I am willing to bet it wasn’t long ago. It may have been said on a chat 
show or at the pub, in a tabloid or a taxi. Almost certainly it included a slang 
term for someone whose mental health is poor. I don’t need to remind you of 
the numerous options. Now imagine the comment was about race, and replace 
the mental health slang with an equivalent word for someone who is black. In 
doing so, you are crossing a line between acceptable and unacceptable 
prejudice. Its existence is a daily reality for people with mental health 
problems, and shames the rest of us (Appleby 2006, 8).  
 
To ridicule the mentally ill using slang terms suggests to Appleby that society fails to 
realise that prejudice is a ‘daily reality’ for people with mental health problems and 
that mockery of mental suffering undermines psychiatry’s goal of social inclusion.  
 
It was for this reason that in 2000 Britain’s Royal College of Psychiatrists 
launched their Changing Minds Campaign to counter psychiatric-related stigma 
(Crisp 2000; 2004). Cynics might note that psychiatrists certainly have a vested 
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interest in doing so because they are amongst the most stigmatized professional 
groups. There is a popular genre of psychiatric joke in which the doctor is made to 
seem madder than the mad. ‘Doctors dealing with the insane have long lamented that 
they get tarred with their patients’ brush, and are popularly associated with lunacy 
itself: words like ‘shrink’ or ‘trick cyclist’ say it all’ (Porter 1991, 238). Tainted by 
association psychiatrists suffer stigma hoist on their own petard, you might say.  
 
 In the three decades since Jasper Carrott mocked the ‘nutter on the bus’ anti-
stigma campaigners have challenged media misrepresentations of mental illness for 
detouring from a ‘correct’ psychiatric label. For instance, the US anti-stigma 
campaigner Otto Wahl (1995) criticised a US peanut advertising campaign in which 
nuts are contained inside joke packaging modelled on a straitjacket complete with a 
label reading ‘Certifiably Nuts’. Wahl argues that such hackneyed comic images 
mask the severity of mental disorders such as schizophrenia and that ‘mental illness is 
no laughing matter’ (Wahl 1995, 32). There is however no consensus on this point.  
 
For instance, in 2008 the organisers of Bonkersfest, a public celebration of 
mad culture, chose their name as a comic counterpoint to stigmatizing psychiatric 
labels such as schizophrenia, which according to Sarah Tonin of Bonkersfest, 
‘promote a culture of fear’ about those coping with the impact of this label (Brand 
2007). Tonin also argued that ‘the term “bonkers” is not insulting; it’s broad and 
lighthearted … because it is both sexual and funny and fits with the celebratory mood 
of the festival’ (Brand 2007, 14). Bonkersfest promotional material also promised 
attendees that it would be ‘One Sandwich Short of a Picnic Fayre on the Camberwell 
Village Greene’, which is clearly intended not only to amuse but also provoke  
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 This is because the English language includes a dazzling range of comic 
words and phrases poking fun at mental illness: ‘The English language is … full of 
light-hearted terms for madness: ‘bonkers’; ‘bananas’; ‘one sandwich short of a 
picnic’ (Games 2007, 8). The notion that these are ‘light-hearted’ terms and phrases 
implies harmless lexical fun, but this of course depends on who is using these terms 
and with what intent. Thus, in a newspaper article promoting a BBC TV programme 
exploring the roots of psychiatric labelling (Balderdash and Piffle, broadcast 11 May 
2007), the comedian and ex-psychiatric nurse Jo Brand discussed comic aspects of 
psychiatric labelling and posed the following questions:  
 
Does “schizophrenic” or even “bipolar” really describe anyone more 
accurately or specifically than “bonkers”? Or does it just sound more 
respectful? Do most people understand what a “mental health service user is”? 
And how soon, in the hands of the cackling British, will these new labels 
become comic labels of abuse? (Brand 2007, 14).  
 
Brand’s questions are pertinent to my own concerns in this article about humour and 
mental distress because the cultural politics of mental distress involves struggle over 
psychiatric definitions and popular meanings. Indeed, the persistence of madness as a 
popular category of lay knowledge (Cross 2010) steers us toward the ways in which 
our culture draws from a reservoir of comical themes, premises and message about 
being out of one’s mind. This includes the mutable figure of the dangerous madman.  
 
Bonkers! Popular humour in a strait-jacket 
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Daniel Pearce, known to his friends as Dowdy, was by all accounts a prankster. By 
day a Corporation macebearer in Salisbury, at night Dowdy scared unsuspecting 
visitors to the city’s taverns with his impersonation of an escaped dangerous Bedlam 
lunatic. When Dowdy died in 1762 his obituary noted that his legendary act included 
‘tatter’d garment, decorations of straw, rattling chains, visage stained with blood … 
[and] frightful tone of voice’, so as to feign the appearance of insanity (Ingram 2005). 
We can only now imagine the stifled laughter amongst those in the know when 
Dowdy reappeared as himself and convinced his victim to search with him for the one 
who had perpetrated what was described in his obituary as ‘this cruel joke’.  
 
Over the years, as madness has given way to scientific notions of ‘mental 
illness’, psychiatry has been unable to distance itself from the comical figure of the 
raving lunatic. The potency of the folk category ‘madness’ in popular humour is not 
surprising when one considers that from the early modern period, ‘in jokes and on the 
stage, the insane have standardly been depicted as strange and dishevelled – as ‘wild 
men’ (Porter 2002, 64). Comic images of frenzied insane were also a staple of early 
modern ballad singers, jesters, and stage buffoons, who milked the image of frenzied 
madness as a character flaw (Porter 2002) through contortion of bodily appearance, 
the popularity of which echoes in contemporary popular culture humour.  
 
 The comical appearance of the madman as out of control finds expression 
across visual media such as film and TV (Wilson et al. 1999; Wahl, 2003). This 
image also appears in the popular press, where the image of the dangerous mental 
patient found rampant expression in ‘scare in the community’ news stories following 
asylum closures in the 1990s (Rose 2002). The re-appearance of the dangerous lunatic 
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set free by well-meaning but foolish psychiatrists to roam the community causing 
mayhem revivified in the British press, where everyday perceptions of mental illness 
associated with ‘bonkers’, ‘craziness’, ‘lunacy’, ‘madness’, and so on are valorised as 
a comic counterpoint to ‘mental illness’ and what psychiatrists ‘know’ (Cross 2010).  
 
Consider the case of Peter Bryan, which is instructive precisely because Bryan 
is dangerous. Briefly, in 2005, Bryan was tried for murder during which it emerged 
that he had eaten his victim’s brain. Bryan had previously murdered in 1993 and was 
sent to a top security hospital, Broadmoor, from which he was released in 2002. Soon 
after his return to Broadmoor Bryan killed for a third time. These events moved one 
broadsheet provocateur to sardonically note: “Today we do not put psychopaths in 
padded cells and throw away the key … In Bryan’s case we let them kill some more 
people and, when they have enough time, eat their brains” (Liddle 2005, 20).  
 
Rod Liddle’s dubious wit belies his real motivation, which was to ridicule the 
apparent ‘complacency of liberal psychiatrists’ who, he claims, fail to recognise how 
the “nutter who eats human brains” has the same dangerous potential as “the nutter 
who merely barks at the traffic every now and then” (Liddle 2005, 20). One does not 
have to be an advanced student of semiotics to recognise that Liddle is here trading on 
the comic motif of psychiatric otherness: “psychopaths in padded cells” and “the 
nutter who … barks at the traffic”. However, one of the shortcomings of anti-stigma 
campaigners is a reluctance to criticize journalists’ lampooning of psychiatric patients 
who are also criminals. It is much simpler to direct criticism of popular humour about 
madness to those we more easily determine are genuinely psychiatrically ill.  
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For instance, in 2003, a notorious front-page story in The Sun reported that ex-
world champion heavyweight boxer Frank Bruno was ‘sectioned’ (legally detained) in 
a psychiatric hospital. The paper’s headline ‘Bonkers Bruno Locked Up’ was 
accompanied by a photograph of a ‘mad-looking’ Bruno with staring eyes and tongue 
poked out (which was in fact taken from publicity materials relating to his post-
boxing career as a pantomime performer). Later editions were altered to a more 
subdued headline, “Sad Bruno in Mental Home”, suggesting (better late than never 
perhaps) that the paper’s ridicule of a popular figure like Bruno was beyond a joke.  
 
 Despite The Sun’s public pronouncement that the editor Rebekah Wade would 
voluntarily undertake mental health training with the psychiatric campaign group 
SANE (Harper 2005), just a few years later Wade’s paper reported on the mental 
distress of ex-England international footballer, Stan Colleymore, who has spoken 
publicly of coping with depression alongside a controversial public profile. The Sun 
reported on Colleymore’s emergency hospital treatment (condensed for brevity): 
 
Soccer star Stan Collymore ranted and raved at hospital casualty staff amid 
fears he had suffered a nervous breakdown. Frightened nurses called cops 
after the former England ace “went berserk”, thumped his fists on the floor 
and yelled: “Don’t you f***ing [sic] know who I am?”  
He was described as “wild-eyed and agitated” when he arrived to complain of 
head pains at Stafford District General Hospital. Witnesses said he was 
shouting incoherently - but there were no signs he had been taking drugs … [] 
One witness to Wednesday night’s incident said: “Stan held his head, sobbing, 
‘Get me out of here.’ Nurses tried to calm him but he kept running out and 
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thumping doors and walls. At one stage he lay on the floor thumping the tiles. 
He shouted, ‘Get me home, call my mother’.” A patient said: “Stan was going 
berserk. He looked a broken man.” (The Sun 3 February 2006, 5)  
 
It is worth noting here that a history of antagonism exists between Collymore and the 
British press (for details see Wagg 2000). This includes targeted exposure by some 
newspapers for engaging in “dogging”, i.e. seeking out strangers for sex acts in public 
places. To this latter image of Colleymore we can also add the mocking tone in the 
article noted above as well as that dished out by Guardian commentator Simon 
Weaver to the notion that professional footballers might seek psychiatric treatment: 
 
 With the weary hope that the players concerned are not otherwise engaged 
with their shrinks or wriggling in strait-jackets in the local giggle house, with 
the wistful dream that the 22 footballers might keep hold of their premiership 
marbles for at least 90 minutes, I plan to attend a Premiership football match 
on Saturday (Weaver quoted in Wagg 2000, 75).  
 
That mental distress is reported in humorous terms in the press (the image of out of 
control footballers “wriggling in strait-jackets in the local giggle house” is intended 
be comical after all) is not incidental of course, but underlines how the frenzied 
appearance of the mentally distressed is the stuff of popular entertainment.  
 
However, I do also want to note that criticism of the press for poking fun at 
mental distress is also contained in something of a strait-jacket. For instance, Beatrice 
Bray, a psychiatric service user writing in The Guardian (23 April 2010, 41), took 
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issue with a Martin Rowson cartoon published in the same paper depicting politicians 
rooting through a children’s dressing-up box. As one lifts up a moth-eaten dress 
belonging to former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, he shouts: “Hey everybody! 
This is the ‘psychotic yet tough union basher’ cozzie [costume]!” Bray argues that 
Rowson’s cartoon ‘overstepped the mark’ in its offensiveness to mentally ill people 
such as herself and indeed Mrs Thatcher (now reported to be suffering from dementia) 
by explaining how, ‘The use of the word “psychotic” was offensive’ for people 
struggling with this condition and that cartoonists should note that when it comes to 
the portraying the topic of mental health, ‘Some things really should be unsayable’.  
 
 Bray’s call for self-censorship on mental health topics by cartoonists like 
Rowson is I suggest ill-founded. Rowson has in the past written in the free-speech 
magazine Index on Censorship of the historical importance of cartoonists in using 
satiric representations of the Mad World of politicians to lampoon the dangerousness 
of power (Rowson 2001). There is for instance a British cartoon tradition satirizing 
‘mad’ George III through the imperial ambitions of Napoleon Bonaparte to more 
recent British tabloid cartoons of the 1980s portraying ‘loony left’ wing politicians as 
dangerous (Curran, Gaber and Petley 2005). In a modern-day classic of the genre 
Rowson depicts Tony Blair’s Iraq misadventures in stages which include ‘delusional 
self-importance’, ‘religious mania’, leading to ‘violent psychotic interlude’ (see: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/cartoons/martinrowson/0,7371,1097095,00.html).  
 
 According to Philo, Henderson and McLaughlin (1996), the popular image of 
the deluded politician is one of several comic stereotypes of mental illness (alongside 
the mad scientist and the paranoiac who says that everyone else but him is mad) that 
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together constitute a major category of British media content. They follow through the 
implications of their claim noting that while it is unacceptable to parody minority 
groups it remains ‘acceptable’ to parody the mentally ill (Philo et al. 1996, 47-9). I 
want to suggest that Philo et al’s argument requires at least some adjustment not only 
because jokes and humour about mental distress have been designated offensive since 
their work was published in the mid-1990s, but also because self-parody has emerged 
as a potent cultural-political weapon in the armoury of ‘mad’ humourists.  
 
Cracking up: on comic ambiguities of being mentally ill and seriously funny 
I want to suggest that the psychiatrically ill do sometimes deserve to have the public 
pay to laugh at them. This is not the beginning of a modest proposal for a paying tour 
of psychiatric hospitals (like the Eighteenth century Bedlam tour) to make up for 
current cutbacks in Government funding of psychiatric services. Rather, I have in 
mind a recently reported case of the National Health Service in the English region of 
Surrey funding ‘Cracking Up’, a comedy show featuring jokes and humorous 
anecdotes about mental illness told by psychiatric service users (Anthony 2010).  
 
According to John Ryan, the professional stand-up comedian who hosted 
‘Cracking Up’, ‘You hear comedians doing jokes about paedophilia, rape, child 
abuse, murder ... no one’s making jokes about mental health’ (Anthony 2010, 19). 
Ryan’s observation is inadvertently misleading since as I noted above, in the case of 
schizophrenia, the problem is precisely an over-abundance of tired jokes about 
schizophrenia/split personality made at the expense of those living and coping with 
the social impact of a schizophrenic label. Ryan’s point that ‘no one’s making jokes 
about mental health’ is presumably intended to mean that no one makes jokes about 
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mental health/illness told from the viewpoint of being a mentally ill joke teller as 
distinct from being the butt of the joke. This is also not quite accurate, however.  
 
 Since 2004 David Granier has offered psychiatric service users in the 
Canadian city of Vancouver training in stand-up comedy techniques. His course, 
Stand Up For Mental Health, is intended to overcome the social stigma attached to 
mental health problems (Cuddington 2009). According to Granier, who is experienced 
both in stand-up comedy and depression, ‘“The more screwed-up and dysfunctional 
you are, the better your act is going to be … “Your life is your act”’ (quoted in 
Jackson 2009). The idea that there is a funny side to being ‘screwed-up’ or 
‘dysfunctional’ (whatever this means to those stand-up performers whom Granier 
tutors) turns the tables on a culture of laughing at not with the mentally ill.  
 
However, it must also be said that this is not a particularly new theme in the 
politics of mental health. For instance, in the multiple Oscar winning film adaptation 
of Ken Kesey’s classic American asylum novel One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest, 
Jack Nicholson’s character Randall P. McMurphy leads a temporary escape of his 
fellow inmates in the asylum to go sea fishing. As they are about to set sail (on a 
classic ‘ship of fools’ of course) their identity as bone fide fishermen is questioned by 
a skeptical boatman. McMurphy playfully tells him the truth, “We are from the state 
mental institution”, before introducing each inmate as psychiatrists and distinguished 
professors. The director Milos Forman invites the audience to see the funny side of 
their supposed ‘dysfunctionality’ as one-by-one each smiling newly anointed 
‘psychiatrist’ faces the boatman/camera/audience to share the joke.  
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 However, turning the tables on the culture of laughing at mental distress is a 
different matter when the legitimacy of the joke teller is uncertain. For instance, at the 
2010 Edinburgh Festival, the American comic Ruby Wax performed her comedy 
show ‘Losing It’ based on her experience of becoming bi-polar during pregnancy. 
Wax reportedly tested the appropriateness of her jokes about mental health in warm-
up gigs given at privately run psychiatric clinics: ‘I’m taking the Mickey [out of the 
mentally ill] at certain points but audiences know I can do that because I’ve got a 
mental illness’ (Sloan 2010, 18). This raises a begged question about whether jokes 
about mental illness are acceptable only when a certified joker, as it were, tells it.  
 
To probe some of the attendant complexities in answering this question I want 
to briefly digress to the case of a British stand-up comic and actor who jokes about 
her cerebral palsy condition. Francesca Martinez has described herself in interviews 
as a ‘wobbly’ comedian (The Telegraph 28 February 2009, 18) and this description, I 
suggest, is one that only Martinez or others with cerebral palsy can make about their 
condition without being thought of as ‘othering’ their disability. However, Martinez’s 
wobbly joke raises another begged question: if you are an ‘other’, are you 
nevertheless still engaging in the cultural practice of ‘othering’ if you joke about that 
which in certain other joke contexts makes you the ‘other’?  
 
 While my interest in this question is obviously focused on the cultural politics 
of joking about mental illness there is here a cultural-political parallel with ‘nigger’ 
(or ‘nigga’) jokes and anecdotes told by US black comedians including Richard Pryor 
and Chris Rock. Their use of ‘nigger’ in stand-up comedy (Weaver 2010a), as well as 
its comedic use in black vernacular more generally (Kennedy 1999), has resulted in 
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linguistic enclosure around the term ‘nigger’ such that when non-black others use the 
term in comic discourse it can result in censure. For instance, in 2007 a female white 
UK Big Brother TV contestant was removed from the show after calling a black 
contestant ‘nigger’. The evicted housemate apologized but claimed to have been 
joking.  
 
 The line between acceptability and offensiveness in humour, as the censured 
Big Brother housemate perhaps came to understand, is in areas such as race highly 
politically sensitive (see Lockyer and Pickering, 2009). Simon Weaver (2011) has 
also drawn attention to interplay between comic ambiguities and offensiveness in 
Sacha Baron Cohen’s comically ambiguous character Ali G. Weaver notes how in 
using comic ambiguity of a white man pretending to be black (or is he pretending to 
be Asian pretending to be black?), Baron Cohen’s character changes the line between 
acceptability and offensiveness in humour. The continuing debate about whether 
Baron Cohen was being racist or anti-racist in his Ali G creation, illuminates how 
comic discourse can undermine and at the same time challenge otherness by the 
Other.  
 
Similar comic ambiguities emerge in cases where comedians attempt to 
reverse the semantic effects of racist discourse. Thus, Weaver (2010a, 43) notes how 
in Chris Rock’s use of ‘niggas’ its reverse connotations are ‘unreliable’ because his 
stand-up routine is drained of political intentionality with his claim that ‘it’s just 
jokes’. As Weaver notes, ‘Racist meaning is generated despite the intentionality of the 
comic rather than because of it’ (Weaver 2010a: 43, emphasis in the original). The 
cultural-political issue here is that in such cases of comic rearticulation of racist 
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terminology an unintentional problem is that in using comic discourses to resist, 
undermine or challenge racial otherness by the Other, it can affirm the otherness that 
was the intentional target of the reversed humour (see also Weaver 2010b).  
 
Avoiding the unintentional consequence of the Other engaging in othering 
whilst ‘just joking’ is what appears to have motivated Ruby Wax to seek approval 
from psychiatric patients for telling jokes and anecdotes about psychiatric conditions 
in her Losing It comedy show. And having had her legitimacy to tell jokes about the 
psychiatrically ill confirmed, Wax subsequently argued that she cannot be ‘othering’ 
mentally ill people in her jokes because she herself is a mentally ill ‘other’. This 
conveniently lets Wax off the hook when it comes to making the mentally ill the butt 
of the joke. This is not quite straight forward however because while I am unable to 
comment on her mental condition, I do want to note that Ruby Wax is an uncertain 
signifier vis-à-vis the cultural politics of laughing with, not at, the mentally ill.  
 
Thus, while Wax is now a high profile mental health advocate both in her 
Losing It show and her BBC online ‘headroom’ campaign in which she takes a mildly 
irreverent approach to advocating on mental health issues, she has in the past been 
criticized for a comic portrayal of mental illness in her 1990s prime time BBC TV 
comedy sketch show The Full Wax. The sketch in question involved a cameo from the 
actor Joanna Lumley playing a hammed-up version of herself as a gibbering 
emotional wreck just released from a psychiatric hospital after having been dumped 
by her husband for a younger woman. Released into Wax’s care, Lumley shows off a 
place mat made from her hair and adorned with razor blades. The sketch culminates in 
Lumley carried off in a straitjacket by singing and dancing ‘men in white coats’.  
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  The British TV screenwriter Donna Franceschild was amongst those who 
rebuked what she termed this ‘toxic’ sketch: ‘Comic Ruby Wax ran a [1993 TV] 
comedy sketch with a shaking, gibbering Joanna Lumley, newly released from the 
“loony bin”, doing an elaborate dance routine in which she was wrapped up in a strait 
jacket. When challenged, the producers always protested that they were just trying to 
“make good television” (Franceschild 2008, 5). I do not intend to use this nearly 
twenty-year-old TV sketch as a stick to beat Ruby Wax’s subsequent conversion to 
mental health advocacy, but rather to note how hackneyed gags that laugh at the 
mentally ill are also deployed so as to laugh with the mentally ill.  
 
For instance, Franceschild’s preferred vehicle for laughing at the 
psychiatrically ill was her BAFTA award winning BBC TV comedy-drama series 
Taking over the Asylum, telling the story of a failed insurance salesman-turned-
hospital radio DJ broadcasting in a Scottish asylum. Franceschild described Taking 
over the Asylum as a counter to the ‘toxic’ Ruby Wax TV sketch noted above, which 
she says ‘is no longer acceptable’ (Franceschild 2008, 5). However, a recurring 
feature of her script was Franceschild’s reliance on stock jokes and humour about 
mental illness.  
 
For instance, when a manic patient begins broadcasting he announces that he 
will be playing “looney tunes”; or when DJ Eddie McKenna turns up to broadcast he 
is told that the last time they tried hospital radio 122 patients complained that they 
were hearing voices; or when a maverick Glaswegian psychiatrist is revealed to be a 
manic-depressive who stops taking medication to control his own condition, viewers 
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understand his empathy for patients as: ‘you don’t have to be mad to work here, but it 
helps’! Franceschild’s own use of hackneyed jokes and humour about mental illness 
echoes Ruby Wax’s earlier straitjacket and men-in-white-coats gags.  
 
The point I want to make in drawing attention to these similarities in 
psychiatric gags is that psychiatric-related humour is, dare I say, always closely 
bound up in a straitjacket of hackneyed comic motifs that are so embedded in our 
popular humour that it is virtually impossible to do without them when representing 
the ambiguously funny side of madness. This is precisely why the Bonkerfest event 
organisers noted earlier deliberately chose to name their event ‘Bonkers’ in order to 
detonate its conventional, often pejorative use in popular culture humour.  
 
However, reclaiming comic terms of abuse that tend to accompany popular 
representation of their condition is fraught with humorous ambiguity. The strategy is 
to neutralise the language and imagery of psychiatric otherness and undermine social 
stigma by draining whatever is spuriously ‘comic’ about mental illness. ‘All this has 
happened’, the writer Jonathan Freedland appreciatively notes, ‘while the rest of us 
have been stuck in the old thinking about nutters and weirdoes. The lunatics have not 
yet taken over the asylum – but they are raising their voice’ (Freedland 1998, 28).  
 
With this in mind I want to note a final illustration of humorous ambiguity 
involving psychiatric patients who raise their voice in the public sphere, in this case 
by being humorously ambiguous with the TV viewing public. In a 2001 BBC TV 
video diary style first-person series format entitled Nuts (dealing for instance with 
topics such as the experience of being sectioned or compulsory medicated), Brian, a 
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self-styled ‘polymathic genius’ discusses and also illustrates his own strategies for 
coping with his bi-polarity and periodic bouts of psychiatric hospitalization. This 
includes a surreally funny sequence in which Brian describes and then illustrates how 
when he is in hospital he constantly changes silly hats (which we see him doing) in 
order, he tells us, to confound psychiatrists by changing his identity/appearance.  
 
By doing so, Brian illustrates to viewers how appearing ‘nuts’ is socially and 
psychiatrically deceptive. As Brian tells viewers, his strategy is purposively for him to 
“look so silly that no-one can be sure that I am not just being silly instead of being 
mad”. He also adds just the right dose of witty self-scepticism by concluding (tongue 
presumably in cheek): “Of course, it could all be a double bluff and I might just be 
silly”. As we watch Brian being (or is he in fact acting?) “nuts”, he goes on to say, “I 
do serious things ... I work with three microscopes on the animals that live in the soil, 
particularly the spring-tailed flees that have been misunderstood for many years”. Is 
he serious or is he “nuts”? That this question is not resolved makes his detonation of 
being/appearing “nuts” all the more poignant, powerful and seriously funny.  
 
Conclusion 
The marginalization of the mentally ill seems likely to become one of the main issues 
for recognition politics over the next few years (Crossley 2006). However, the notion 
that the psychiatrically ill are more or less incapable of giving a valid viewpoint is 
often enough to ensure their marginalization from more ‘rational’ forms of public 
discourse (Cross 2010). As we have seen though, psychiatric service users in 
countries such as Canada and Great Britain are adopting a variety of humorous tactics 
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because they recognize that popular humour about mad-folk is never benign; they can 
and often do convey the funny things they say and do, which make us laugh at them.  
 
Like other representational forms and cultural practices dealing with 
psychiatric illness, jokes and humour about mental distress carry historical weight 
framing our social relations with psychiatrically ill others. Thus, historical depictions 
of madness and mad people in comic representations illuminate what has changed in 
our own humorous engagement with psychiatric otherness. Consequently, the cultural 
practice of othering the psychiatrically ill in jokes and humour buffers up against the 
changed social circumstances of mentally ill people’s re-emergence into the public 
sphere and the opportunities this affords for telling jokes, gags and wisecracks about 
their own (and others’) experience of mental distress on their own comedic terms.  
 
Thus, to suggest, as many anti-stigma campaigners do, that we should repress 
jokes and humour about madness or mental distress, even with the best of socially 
progressive intentions, in my view misunderstands how popular humour about 
madness/mental distress involves more than just calculated insult. This is because 
comedic images and representations of madness/mental distress are cultural forms and 
practices that speak to and about everyday perceptions of madness. Laughing at 
lunacy is where comedic forms/practices meet with ambiguity about what we think 
madness is/is not. It is also where we can see possibilities for distanced social 
relations between the mad and the not-so-mad beginning to crack in shared laughter.  
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